Meditations on First Philosophy
Undoubtedly, the •ideas that represent substances amount to something more—they contain within themselves more representative reality—than do the •ideas that merely represent modes [= ‘qualities’].
— Third Meditation
Again, the •idea that gives me my understanding of a supreme God
— Third Meditation
But it is also true that the idea of heat or of a stone can be caused in me only by something that contains at least as much reality as I conceive to be in the heat or in the stone.
— Third Meditation
I call a perception claram when it is present and accessible to the attentive mind—just as we say that we see something clare when it is present to the eye’s gaze and stimulates it with a sufficient degree of strength and accessibility. I call a perception distinctam if, as well as being clara, it is so sharply separated from all other perceptions that every part of it is clarum.. . . . The example of pain shows that a perception can be clara without being distincta but not vice versa. When for example someone feels an intense pain, his perception of it is clarissima, but it isn’t always clear, because people often get this perception muddled with an obscure judgment they make about something that they think exists in the painful spot. . . .
— Third Meditation
natural impulses
— Third Meditation
Things that are revealed by the natural light—for example, that if I am doubting then I exist—are not open to any doubt,because no other faculty that might show them to be false could be as trustworthy as the natural light.
— Third Meditation
Perhaps they come from some faculty of mine other than my will—one that I don’t fully know about—which produces these ideas without help from external things
— Third Meditation
When I say ‘Nature taught me to think this’, all I mean is that •I have a spontaneous impulse to believe it, not that •I am shown its truth by some natural light.
— Third Meditation
Two things follow from this: that something can’t arise from nothing, and that what is more perfect—that is, contains in itself more reality—can’t arise from what is less perfect.
— Third Meditation
pushed me the wrong way
— Third Meditation
The next belief
— Second Meditation
Indeed, I think I have often discovered objects to be very unlike my ideas of them.
— Third Meditation
通过经验外部事物然后在脑中形成的关于外部事物的观念。
— Third Meditation理智，理性。
— First Meditation正是因为I am a thinking thing，这是我的nature，所以当我通过感官经验事物，必然会形成关于事物的ideas。这不是我的意志所驱使的，是我最纯粹的nature所导致的。
— Third Meditation我们过往所有的信念，不是零散、孤立的碎砖头，而是一栋完整的大厦；所有具体的信念，都建立在少数几个共同的【地基 / 底层基础原则】之上，所有的日常认知、科学知识，都是从这些底层原则推导、延伸出来的；想要推倒整栋大厦，只要把最核心的地基挖空，上面的所有建筑就会自行彻底坍塌。
— First Meditationadj. 欺骗的；骗人的；不诚实的。
从 “某个为真的命题（我在思考）恰好伴随‘清楚分明的感知’”，能否推导出 “‘清楚分明的感知’就是使命题为真的原因 / 标准”？这一点是笛卡尔上述这段文字的一大漏洞：1.为什么 “命题为真” 必须有 “可被我识别的标志”？有没有可能 “真” 本身就是命题的属性，不需要额外的 “标志”？（比如 “2 是偶数” 为真，不是因为我 “清楚分明地感知到”，而是它本身就是数学事实，感知只是我认识它的方式，不是它为真的原因）；2.为什么 “我在思考” 身上，只有 “清楚分明” 这一个 “候选标志”？你说的 “可能有其他未被发现的特质” 完全成立 —— 比如 “‘我在思考’无法被怀疑（怀疑本身就是思考）” 这个特质，才是它为真的核心原因，而 “清楚分明的感知” 只是 “无法被怀疑” 带来的 “副产品”（因为无法被怀疑，所以我对它的感知才会特别清楚分明）。
— Third Meditation我的这些习惯性成见，确实是高度可信的；尽管正如我已经证明的，它们在某种意义上是可怀疑的，但相信它们依然比否定它们要更合乎常理。可如果我继续以这种眼光看待它们，我就永远摆脱不了对它们轻易表示认同的习惯。因此，要战胜这种习惯，我最好彻底调转方向，在一段时间里，假装我这些过往的成见全都是彻底虚假、完全虚构的。
— First Meditation倒装，等价于：i can see no way to resolve them.
n. 观念，认识，看法。
欺骗和错误并非 “完美” 的属性，而是 “不完美” 的体现。这意味着，若 “我” 容易被欺骗，说明 “我” 存在缺陷；而这种缺陷的程度，与 “我存在的根源” 的完美程度直接相关 —— 根源越不完美，“我” 的缺陷就可能越严重，甚至到 “永远被欺骗” 的地步。要想我不陷入“永远被欺骗”的境地，那么我的存在必须通过一个“绝对完美的根源”来解释，而只有全知全能至善的上帝才符合这个条件。
adj. 无情的；不屈不挠的；不松懈的。
adj. 正当的，合理的；合法的，依法的。